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ABSTRACT
Conventional policy and academic discourses have generally held illicit 
drug economies in Latin America to be synergistic with violence and 
instability. The case of post-transition Bolivia (1982–1993) confounds 
such assumptions. Applying a political economy approach, this article 
moves beyond mainstream analyses to examine how the Bolivian 
drug trade became interwoven with informal forms of governance, 
order and political transition. I argue that state–narco networks – a 
hangover from Bolivia’s authoritarian era – played an important 
role in these complex processes. In tracing the evolution of these 
interactions, the article advances a more nuanced theorisation of the 
relationship between the state and the drug trade in an understudied 
case.
Introduction: state–narco networks in post-transition Bolivia
Conventional policy and academic discourses have generally held illicit drug economies in 
Latin America to be synergistic with violence and instability. The case of post-transition 
Bolivia (1982–1993) confounds such assumptions. Despite the exponential growth of the 
Bolivian coca-cocaine economy during this period, the drug trade remained relatively peace-
ful. Furthermore, after decades of coup and counter-coup d’état, the country sustained its 
long-promised democratic transition. This article considers the role of state–narco networks 
within these complex processes – an important factor in the function of the drug trade, 
shaping its wider political, social and economic effects. Moving beyond mainstream analyses 
of drugs, I examine how the illicit economy became interwoven with informal forms of 
governance, order and political transition.
I argue that state–narco networks of the post-transition period were grounded in Bolivia’s 
historic political development. During the country’s military authoritarian era (1964–1982), 
emergent local drug trafficking organisations were absorbed into existing political structures. 
These acted to manage and mediate the violent excesses of the illicit economy, as Bolivian 
traffickers favoured accommodation with each other and the state over conflict. Drug rents 
were, in turn, integrated into clientelistic modes of governance, and used to reinforce the 
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political order. Following democratic transition in 1982, these state–narco networks contin-
ued to function. Reflecting the diffusion of political power, though, once-centralised net-
works now became more atomised: running through the military, the police and the political 
parties. These took on new meaning. Mutual toleration of drug links was now bound to the 
maintenance of fragile political equilibrium between these actors during an uncertain pro-
cess of transition. Tracing the evolution of state–narco networks during a period of political 
flux, the article reveals the significance of these interactions to regime consolidation and an 
uneven democratisation.
This analysis addresses the undertheorisation of the relationship between the state and 
drug trade in Latin America (and beyond) within conventional policy and academic dis-
courses of drugs. These discourses are informed by a liberal, Weberian conception of the 
state, where the drug trade is viewed as necessarily violent, destabilising and synonymous 
with ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states.1 However, this perspective tends to misrepresent the 
function of the state in postcolonial settings, and hence fails to capture the distinct forms 
of interaction that may emerge between the state and the drug trade in different contexts. 
This is an important variable in the relationship between violence, order and illicit drugs. 
Analysis of state–narco relations must, therefore, take the ‘empirical reality’2 of the state as 
a point of departure: engaging with ‘how states actually function, rather than how they 
ought to’.3 Building on a political economy framework, the article explores the role of drug 
rents ‘as a key source and vector of power’4 in Bolivia’s historic political development. As 
such, it unpacks the top-down assumptions of the mainstream policy and academic dis-
course to bring greater nuance to theorisations of state–narco relations.
While much of the political economy of illicit drugs literature focuses on authoritarian 
and (post-)conflict societies, this article considers how informal forms of governance con-
nected to the drug trade partly underpinned Bolivia’s uneven democracy. The term ‘uneven 
democracy’ is drawn from O’Donnell, referring to a common phenomenon seen across Latin 
America’s Third Wave.5 The region’s new democracies adopted the formal rules and proce-
dures of democracy, such as regular elections, while maintaining elements of the authori-
tarian past. This included clientelistic practices and unaccountable institutions. State actors 
operated according to informal rules and structures. This informalism – in part a consequence 
of factionalised states and intra-elite competition – is crucial to understanding the function 
of state–narco networks during the post-transition period. Governmental tacit acceptance 
of state–narco networks and patron–client bonds, and reluctance to implement democra-
tising institutional reforms of the security forces, formed part of an unspoken post-transition 
settlement between the main actors. The article contends that within the context of the 
fragmented Bolivian state, the control of drug rents was enmeshed with the path of 
democratisation.
I employ an intensive case study research design and qualitative methodology to trace 
the evolution of state–narco relations. This approach includes the use of secondary and 
documentary sources to construct a historical baseline account of the case, outlining the 
interplay of the changing political context and the development of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine 
economy. These sources are supplemented by 38 interviews conducted largely with high-
level political actors from the post-transition period. Interviewees include US Embassy per-
sonnel previously based in La Paz, and former Bolivian government ministers and high-ranking 
state officials. Participants are afforded anonymity where requested. This was addressed as 
part of the process of informed consent, applied in accordance with the conditions of 
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institutional ethical approval for research.6 While the article considers the effects of US policy 
preferences in Bolivia on the development of state–narco networks, the analysis primarily 
centres on dynamics between domestic actors. This approach allows for a historical perspec-
tive of the development of state–narco relations in Bolivia.
Individuals were selected for interview due to the key role they played during this period 
in Bolivian politics, policy implementation and counterdrug efforts. The positionality of inter-
locutors, as political elites situated within or closely linked with the Bolivian state, gave them 
insight into the relationship between state agents and the drug trade. Their historical 
accounts reveal distinct understandings and interpretations of state–narco interactions, 
how they related to wider political pressures and the groundedness of these networks in 
local contextual factors. Interviews thus offer novel insights on the function – and significance 
– of state–narco relations.
Theorising state–narco relations in Latin America
In this section, I unpack the conventional discourses of illicit drug economies in Latin America. 
Policy and academic discourses are considered separately. The latter has tended to be critical 
of the former: challenging the effectiveness of counterdrug responses and highlighting their 
often-damaging consequences. Both discourses, though, share similar underlying assump-
tions around the nature of the drug trade. Crucially, this leads to an undertheorisation of 
state–narco relations.
Policy discourses
Within policy discourses, the illicit drug economy in Latin America is commonly associated 
with insecurity, instability and ineffective governance; the ‘war on drugs’ prescribes ‘more 
state’ and securitised policies in response. Elements of this paradigm may be traced back to 
the inception of the modern US drug war in the 1980s, as US counterdrug policy adopted 
the language and logic of securitisation. Two facets of the Andean drug trade as ‘threat’ were 
advanced: the societal harms caused by drug use in the US,7 and the destabilising effects of 
the coca-cocaine economy in ‘America’s backyard’.8 In terms of the latter, this included the 
violence and corruption of powerful drug-trafficking organisations, real and imagined col-
lusion with ‘narco-guerrillas’, and attached social, economic and political instability.9 These 
were used as justification for the extension of US counter-supply efforts abroad. Defeat of 
the drug trade through a militarised response was held as a catch-all cure for the interacting 
‘security threats’ of drugs. The tenets of this drug war approach have had an enduring influ-
ence not only on US counterdrug policy, but on other key actors of international drug control. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), for example, has warned of the 
onset of ‘narco-states’, overrun by the power and influence of illicit drugs.10 In certain cases, 
such warnings are linked to the greed/economic model of post-Cold War civil conflict: asso-
ciating ‘lootable’ resources, such as drugs, to insurgency and potential state breakdown.11
Wider Western security paradigms of ‘fragile’, ‘weak’ or ‘failed/failing’ states are evident 
within these policy narratives.12 Underpinned by ‘an idealised notion of the state’, the pres-
ence of the drug trade is demonstrative of ‘state fragility’ and lack of capacity to ‘centralise 
the means of coercion’.13 ‘Fragile states’ are ‘perceived as providing breeding grounds and 
safe havens for transnational terrorism, weapons proliferation, and organised crime’.14 These 
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‘ungoverned spaces’ thus represent a challenge to Western global order, spawning cross-bor-
der security threats and regional instability.15 Establishing effective state institutions within 
such cases is viewed as a fundamental prerequisite to sustainable development.16 Liberal 
state-building notions of establishing ‘effective sovereignty’, reforming government institu-
tions, bolstering security forces and creating alternative rural economies have bled into 
securitised counterdrug responses as a result.
Academic discourses
The academic literature on drugs in Latin America is diverse, but critical voices of international 
drug control predominate. Securitisation of drugs is largely rejected, with authors such as 
Bagley, Buxton and Loveman, for example, highlighting the role of the US ‘war on drugs’ in 
deepening drug-related violence and instability in Latin America.17  This includes human 
rights abuses carried out by heavily armed counterdrug units. Such policy interventions may 
also interact with the market dynamics of prohibition. ‘Successful’ counterdrug policies – eg 
the capture of a ‘drug kingpin’ – disrupt markets, creating scarcity and raising prices, thereby 
increasing incentives and intensifying violent competition between rival groups.18 The ‘war 
on drugs’, therefore, is an important explanatory factor of violence and instability in Latin 
America.
Areas of this literature, though, also draw on many of the same premises of the policy 
discourse, including the assumption of ‘drugs, violence and instability’ and a tendency to 
view the drug trade through the lens of state fragility. Youngers and Rosin, for example, 
highlight the role of ‘the drug trade itself’ in generating violence, and fuelling armed conflict 
across Latin America, as well as the weakness of state institutions to resist the power of drug 
trafficking organisations.19 The Mexican state’s failure to fulfil its Weberian function grounds 
Bunker and Sullivan’s analysis of the challenge posed by Mexican Cartel violence,20 while 
Rosen and Kassab draw links between low state capacity and the proliferation of drug traf-
ficking, violence and insecurity throughout the region.21 In addition to destructive and 
inadequate policy responses, the damaging presence of the illicit drug trade in Latin America 
is thus perceived as a problem of ineffective governance and ‘weak states’.
Political economy of illicit drugs
This perspective has limitations in accounting for the development of state–narco relations. 
It is certainly the case that major drug producing and transit nations in Latin America have 
frequently fallen short of the Weberian ideal type state. For example, fragmented and poorly 
institutionalised states create opportunities for organised crime to pursue its business inter-
ests. This may entail, for example, subversion of state institutions through narco-corruption, 
mafia de facto control of areas of the national territory and inter-group violence.22 State 
institutions lack the capacity (or willingness) to extend public goods evenly across society 
in such contexts, including security and the rule of law. But in maintaining a ‘dogmatic adher-
ence’ to a Weberian conceptualisation of the state, this framework fails to engage with the 
‘distinctive forms of empirical statehood’23 observable across Latin America. As Morton 
argues, this represents ‘a pathological view of conditions in postcolonial states as one of 
deviance, aberration and breakdown of the norms of Western statehood’.24
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THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY  5
Throughout Latin America, distinct and enduring forms of statehood have emerged from 
specific historical trajectories. Forms of political authority and modes of state power have 
frequently diverged from the principles of the Weberian nation-state.25 In some contexts, 
the drug trade may be intimately bound up in these divergent practices. While the lens of 
‘fragile states’ may demonstrate that major production and trafficking of illicit drugs repre-
sents a failure of the liberal-Weberian state with attached negative connotations for demo-
cratic development, it also obscures important contextual factors that determine state–narco 
relations and their wider social, political and economic effects.
My application of a political economy approach to illicit drugs incorporates this insight 
and seeks to unpack the underlying assumptions of the mainstream drugs discourse: prob-
lematising the relationship between the state and the drug trade, and tracing the implica-
tions of these interactions beyond the general expectation of ‘drugs, violence and instability’. 
This framework necessitates contextualisation of the Bolivian state, and a focus ‘on the dis-
tribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes 
that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time’,26  including the distribution 
of drug rents.
Snyder’s work on ‘lootable wealth’ is useful in explaining such dynamics, while helping 
to unpick the relationship between ‘drug, violence and instability’.27 Whether the drug trade 
is associated with political order, or violence and instability, is in part dependent on the 
political economy of extraction. In some cases, for example, societal actors may inde-
pendently control resources, such as illicit drugs, accumulating wealth that allows them to 
challenge central state authority, thereby fuelling political disorder. Alternatively, the estab-
lishment of ‘institutions of joint-wealth extraction’ – ‘informal bargains rooted in personal 
ties among rulers, their cronies, and private elites’28 – may solidify common interests between 
state and societal actors. Here, the state protects and fosters illicit enterprise in return for 
rents. Through joint wealth-extraction, a level of order and stability may be achieved. 
Potentially hostile rivals are absorbed into existing political institutions, and drug rents pro-
vide political leaders with the tools to govern. This incorporates the maintenance of patri-
monial state systems, and the management of competition between different actors in the 
illicit economy. The construction of state authority in these contexts occurs in negotiation 
with societal actors and is linked to the establishment of shifting alliances between elite 
factions, within which the control of drug rents becomes a factor. In such cases, top-down 
narratives of drugs fail to account for the ‘structured variation’ of political, social and eco-
nomic conditions in source/transit nations,29 the distinct forms of interaction that arise 
between the state and the illicit economy in different contexts, and how these influence the 
wider effects of the drug trade.
Bolivia’s authoritarian era state–narco networks (1964–1982)
Different theories have been advanced for the relative lack of drug-related violence in Bolivia 
during the post-transition period. Thoumi, for example, argues that Bolivia was vertically 
integrated into cocaine transit routes in the 1980s, controlled by the Colombian Cartels.30 
Violent competition for dominance occurred predominantly further up the commodity chain, 
rather than in Bolivia itself. Additionally, Bolivia was not subject to the same intensity of 
militarised counterdrug policies as its regional neighbours. All-out war was declared against 
Pablo Escobar and the Medellin Cartel, for example; less-confrontational policies were 
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pursued against Bolivian organised crime. This meant that the Bolivian drug market remained 
more stable.
At this time, Bolivia’s regional role in the Andean cocaine trade was primarily that of coca 
producer (see Figure 1). Coca provided small-scale producers – organised into sindicatos or 
unions – with a relatively modest but vital source of income. These producers defended their 
ancestral right to cultivate coca, given its domestic licit use and cultural significance to 
indigenous populations. Major local organised crime, though, also operated in Bolivia during 
this period. These groups grew wealthy from processing coca into low-grade products, before 
transporting them to their partners in Colombia.  Estimates of the illicit trade and assertions 
around the division of its profits should be treated with caution, but Figure 2 indicates that 
Bolivia’s trafficking clans headed an industry estimated to be worth 15% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) by 1988. While it is certainly the case that these organisations were dwarfed 
by their Colombian counterparts, they were significant within the Bolivian context.
This view of Bolivian organised crime clashes with local narratives around the country’s 
role in the drug trade. Bolivian politicians argued against the onset of the US ‘war on drugs’, 
claiming Bolivia as a humble producer of coca, linked to underdevelopment.31 According to 
this narrative, power and wealth were accumulated by external criminal groups, who were 
responsible for the most deleterious effects of the drug trade. In-depth analysis of US–
Bolivian relations and counterdrug responses is outside the scope of this article.32 Control 
of coca, however, largely formed the focus of the US drug strategy in Bolivia – through a mix 
of enforcement and development efforts. This created friction with coca-growing commu-
nities, but avoided the intensive drug war violence witnessed in Colombia.
The regional structure of the drug trade and policy responses are, therefore, important 
explanatory factors for the nature of Bolivia’s illicit economy during this period. Analysis of 
state–narco networks adds an important element to these perspectives, accounting for the 
role of informal forms of governance around the drug trade in helping to mediate violence 
and engender stability in the Bolivian leg of the Andean cocaine trade.
Figure 1. Coca cultivation in the andean region (1985–1995). data source: estimates of coca cultivation, 
uS State department, International Narcotics Control Strategy, 1991 and 1995.
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THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY  7
These networks were first established during the military authoritarian government of 
General Rene Barrientos (1964–1969), then extended and deepened under the regimes of 
General Hugo Banzer (1971–1978) and General Luis García Meza (1980–1981). I use the term 
‘state–narco networks’ to refer to stable, regular modes of exchange between agents of the 
state and high-level actors of the drug trade.33 The coca unions, while important actors in 
the Bolivian case generally, are excluded from my analysis. Focus is instead given to high-
level organised crime, as the formation of state–narco-type systems based around drug 
crops, such as coca, is unlikely due to the low barriers to entry at this level of the trade and 
its diffuse nature.34 Modes of exchange, therefore, typically involve the extraction of drug 
rents from high-level actors for non-enforcement of the law and/or the official protection 
of state agents. Such networks formed one facet of the clientelistic mode of governance 
that enabled these military regimes to co-opt political support and consolidate power, while 
managing competition in the drug trade.
This reflected the Bolivian state’s patrimonial and fragmented nature.35 Intra-elite com-
petition for capture of the state characterised the period, as loose coalitions, formed of dif-
ferent sectors, looked to control the state apparatus in pursuit of their particular interests. 
Both ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ elements may be identified within the Bolivian state, with attached 
variations in capacity (and willingness) to exercise authority in different domains. Here, the 
factionalised Bolivian military was preeminent, not only in its control of executive power 
but through the military officers assuming political posts and managerial roles in state enter-
prises, as well as the institution’s ties ‘to peasant groups and crucial political elites’.36 Military 
leaders looked to the patronage of the state to build alliances within the institution, while 
also binding additional state and societal actors to their regime. Drug rents constituted an 
Figure 2. Size of Bolivian coca-cocaine economy in uS$ millions (1986–1990). data sources: estimates 
of the size of the Bolivian coca-cocaine economy plotted against Bolivian gross domestic product (GdP) 
data. Franks, “la economía de la Coca”, 20; World Bank, “Bolivia: GdP data”.
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8   A. GILLIES
important part of this system of control. With national coca production used as a proxy 
measure, Figure 3 indicates the exponential growth of the coca-cocaine economy over this 
period.37 Military authoritarian regimes sought to colonise rents from the illicit trade with 
political allies, including military officers and ‘crucial political elites’. In this sense, drug rents 
were one factor in the ‘shifting alliances of power between elites and social actors’ that 
determined the uneven and ‘discontinuous construction of state authority’ in Bolivia.38
The personalistic regime of Barrientos, for example, used rents from the emerging Bolivian 
drug trade to forge patron–client bonds through the state.39 Barrientos encouraged sup-
porters within the military and the police to facilitate, and profit from, cocaine production 
in the departments of the Beni and Santa Cruz. As well as buying support, this form of 
patronage also gave the regime leverage over potential rivals, eg by threatening to expose 
drug corruption.40 Lands were also granted to backers of the government in Bolivia’s eastern 
departments, which were fast becoming a key strategic point in the Andean drug trade. 
Although Barrientos had courted the peasant sector with promises of advancing the redis-
tributive principles of the 1952 revolution, the regime instead used land reform laws to award 
‘larger plots to fewer people in a more discrete exploitation of the statute for political ends’.41 
As well as benefitting new agricultural elites, parcels of land in the Beni and Santa Cruz would 
be used by military officers to set up coca processing labs and hidden landing strips. These 
practices helped to create linkages between the state and the incipient drug trade.
Banzer also used drug rents as a form of patronage. The cocaine boom of the 1970s and 
the mid-decade collapse of international cotton prices, though, meant that coca-cocaine 
took on greater importance. Banzer cultivated societal support in the eastern lowlands of 
Bolivia, as Santa Cruz and its surrounding agri-business became an engine of the national 
economy.42 High prices for cotton in particular had encouraged large investments in the 
crop. But when world market prices fell dramatically in the mid-1970s, the lucrative returns 
promised by coca-cocaine ventures offered a solution to potential bankruptcy.43 In the sec-
ond half of the 1970s, the drug economy would grow significantly in Santa Cruz and the 
Figure 3. estimates of Total national coca production (1970–1990). data source: Bolivian government 
estimates reproduced in Justiniano and doria Medina, Drogas, 79.
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THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY  9
neighbouring Beni department as agri-business elites turned their attention to illicit enter-
prise. Reports suggest that state support played a role in this shift, with soft loans provided 
by the state-backed Banco Agrícola de Bolivia.44 Accelerated land redistribution to military 
officers in the Beni, meanwhile, also deepened state–narco networks. Such officers were 
able to extract rents for use of their land as a logistical stop-off point for trafficker flights. 
During this period, therefore, ‘the illegal industry grew and developed a tight nexus with 
Santa Cruz’s elite and the military’.45
This nexus was facilitated by personal links between state actors and traffickers within 
Bolivia’s small elite, as well as the fluidity of the ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ spheres. Most notably, Roberto 
Suárez Gómez – ‘the King of Cocaine’ – was well connected to Bolivian elite circles as a large 
land-owner with ‘aristocratic’ family ties to the military.46 This included, for example, his first 
cousin, Colonel Luís Arce Gómez, who was later dubbed García Meza’s ‘Minister of Cocaine’. 
Agri-business elites moved between legitimate enterprise and the drug trade; officers strad-
dled their military careers and ventures in coca-cocaine. This dynamic blurred lines between 
these spheres and helped to establish a network of patron–client relations. Reflecting profit 
maximisation motives and Bolivia’s clientelistic culture, traffickers viewed themselves as 
‘functional economic actors’, and, working through elite networks, pursued ‘a strategy of 
peaceful coexistence with the state’.47 These relations cemented generally cooperative 
dealings between Bolivia’s main trafficking groups, acting to manage competition. According 
to journalist reports, this was also aided by the targeting of potential competitors to state-
linked traffickers by the security forces.48 Snyder and Duran-Martinez note that this kind of 
consolidation – also encouraged by the consolidation of trafficking routes by the Colombian 
cartels49 – eases systems of rent extraction by reducing the number of actors and creating 
more certain transactions.50 As such, the colonisation of the drug trade by the state and the 
consolidation of its structure helped to create more centralised, stable state–narco 
networks.
While drug links were downplayed during the governments of Barrientos and Banzer, 
state–narco networks came to define the García Meza regime. Against the backdrop of the 
Cold War, the US had turned a blind eye to the indiscretions of their anti-communist allies in 
the Bolivian military. The presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977–1981), though, shifted US foreign 
policy in the Americas. The Banzer regime was pressured to implement democratising reforms 
and, after a series of inconclusive elections, the leftist Unidad Democrática y Popular (UDP)51 
eventually came to power, in 1980. García Meza’s ‘cocaine coup’ of July that year brought to 
a halt these first faltering steps towards democracy. The regime had gambled on gaining US 
backing for its ‘anti-communist’ credentials from the incoming Reagan administration. Instead, 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and local journalists fully exposed the regime’s 
close links to drug trafficking,52 forcing the Reagan administration to condemn the coup and 
withhold US support. The case demonstrated the rise of the US ‘war on drugs’ in the Andes.
In building internal support for his coup, García Meza looked to exploit his links to the 
drug trade, distributing patronage in the form of drug rents.53 Drug trafficking groups – 
fearful of the potential business implications of open, democratic government – were more 
than willing to put up such funds. Suggestions that the UDP was consulting with the DEA 
to increase counterdrug cooperation with the US seemed to confirm their suspicions.54 It 
was reported that Roberto Suárez convened Bolivia’s top drug traffickers several months 
before the coup to pool their resources  in support of García Meza.55 In this sense, the interests 
of traffickers entered into the calculations of would-be regime leaders, such as García Meza, 
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because drug rents could be diverted to political rivals. The new government thus called on 
its personal ties to these traffickers and co-opted their support with the promise of 
protection.
The García Meza regime lasted little more than a year due to its lack of a wide base of 
societal support, failure to address a growing national debt crisis and pressure to relinquish 
power from both the US and elements within the military. This demonstrates the limits of 
regime consolidation based solely on state–narco networks. In the case of Barrientos, for 
example, his pact with the rural sector was crucial to sustaining his rule, while Banzer’s delivery 
of economic growth largely formed the basis of his government’s ‘legitimacy’. Left–Right divi-
sions also engendered support for these authoritarian regimes from military and police fac-
tions, right-wing political parties, business, the middle classes and the country’s international 
patron, the US. In this sense, the role of Bolivian state–narco networks in reinforcing – or indeed 
weakening – regime authority must be considered in relation to these wider factors.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that regime leaders of this period used drug rents 
to build factional coalitions with both state and societal actors, including wealthy trafficking 
groups. These networks managed competition between drug trafficking clans, and built on 
the kinship ties that ran through Bolivia’s small elite. Distribution of economic benefits dis-
couraged violence and disorder, binding the interests of these actors to the regime. In this 
sense, drug rents were a tool of governance: political actors exploited the illicit economy to 
consolidate power. According to liberal-state building perspectives, the growth of the drug 
trade evidences the state as ‘weak’. However, this perspective has limited utility in accounting 
for the Bolivian state’s distinct historic development and the drug trade’s interaction with 
these processes, including the reinforcement of the Bolivian state’s patrimonial and frag-
mented nature.
Post-transition state–narco networks (1982–1993)
Democratic transition in 1982 represented a point of fracture for these centralised state–
narco networks. First, the end of the authoritarian era led to the diffusion of political power, 
with the parties and police becoming more prominent. Second, shifting US priorities in 
Bolivia placed the governments of the post-transition period under increasing pressure to 
apply securitised counterdrug policies. Third, a new generation of drug traffickers rose to 
prominence, changing the structure of Bolivia’s organised crime and severing previous links 
to the main state actors of the authoritarian period. Gamarra argues that the process of 
democratisation thus ‘had the paradoxical effect of democratising the structure of organised 
crime’.56 These developments prompted the break-up of centralised systems and the estab-
lishment of more atomised state–narco networks in their place. Actors within the drug trade 
sought to forge new links and build on ‘existing modes of illegal practice in the armed forces, 
police and leading political parties in a relatively “unpartisan” fashion’.57 As before, drug 
trafficking groups were able to work through state structures.58
These adapted networks took on new meaning in the post-transition period. Beyond 
building factional coalitions and reinforcing the political order as had been the case previ-
ously, state–narco interactions were now interwoven with a fragile equilibrium between the 
main political actors. The path of Bolivia’s political transition is an important contextual factor 
here. The opening of the political system under Banzer had led to a period of political insta-
bility, revealing the deeply factionalised nature of the Bolivian state and deep fissures in 
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society.59 The collapse of García Meza’s regime had ensured the restoration of the UDP gov-
ernment, as the disgraced military withdrew from power. Deep divisions and fragmented 
state power, though, still remained. This was ‘democratisation by default’, with the main 
‘praetorian’ actors ‘discredited and marginalised rather than persuaded of the benefits of 
cooperation’.60 The transition was not rooted in convergence between different sectoral 
interests, but rather in the exhaustion of other routes to power. Hence, there was uncertainty 
over each actor’s commitment to democratic transition. Challenging the interests of the 
military or other key political actors was viewed to place the transition at risk. In this game 
of political elites, destabilising actions and a possible spike in drug-related violence were to 
be avoided. ‘Democratic governability’ was prioritised.61 This incorporated political pacts 
and the trading of patronage, the autonomy of the military and police, and a lack of trans-
parency and accountability in Bolivia’s uneven democracy.
The main political parties: ADN, the MIR and the MNR
A series of drug scandals exposed each of the main political parties’ links to actors in the 
illicit trade. For example, the 1988 ‘Narcovideo’ scandal showed officials from both the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) and Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) 
meeting personally with Roberto Suarez to discuss contributions to the parties. Furthermore, 
President Jaime Paz Zamora’s (1989–1993) Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) was 
accused of taking campaign contributions from prominent drug trafficker – and former army 
captain – Isaac ‘Oso’ Chavarría. It was believed that the parties typically accepted ‘kick-backs’ 
in exchange for promises of protection.62 The US Embassy suspected the MIR, in particular, 
of having a close relationship with drug trafficking following the appointment of drug-
tainted officials to prominent counterdrug postings.63 The extent of these links, and the 
influence of traffickers on the governments of the day, is open to debate. However, many 
believed drug money lubricated patron–client bonds within the parties.64 While politicians 
would occasionally throw accusations of corruption at each other for political gain, inquiries 
into the depth of drug links in the political class rarely uncovered anything of substance. 
Critics branded periodic congressional investigations of drug scandals as whitewashes, with 
convenient scapegoats identified and ‘bad apples’ blamed for systemic corruption.65 The 
parties, though, maintained a collective ‘vow of silence’ over the issue.66
Elite Bolivian political actors prioritised the political stability of the transition.67 Siles 
Suazo’s UDP administration (1982–1985), for example, had been marked by economic crisis 
and legislative deadlock. The parties subsequently turned to political pacts68 as a way of 
establishing stable government. Politicians of the period were shaped by their experiences 
of historic political instability and decades of authoritarianism.69 The Pacto por la Democracia 
under Paz Estensorro (1985–1989) and the subsequent Acuerdo Patriótico of Paz Zamora’s 
presidency (1989–1993) created alignment between the president and congress, breaking 
deadlock and allowing the executive’s legislative agenda to pass. The political parties hailed 
this spirit of compromise, effective governance and the coming of age of the self-proclaimed 
‘democracy generation’.70 In the case of the Acuerdo Patriótico, for example, Paz Zamora’s 
leftist MIR party entered into government with Hugo Banzer’s right-wing ADN, despite having 
been subjected to repression under the former dictator’s regime. Once-enemies now claimed 
to be putting democracy, political stability and the national interest before a painful history.71 
Within this context, exposing drug links threatened to bring down the edifice of the 
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‘democracy generation’ and collapse political compromise. The issue was downplayed, and 
the maintenance of political stability prioritised.
Of course, mutual interests in the illicit economy may also have played a part in this 
dynamic. No party could claim a spotless record over the issue, and so each had much to 
lose over the disclosure of drug corruption among the political class. In addition to this, 
some highlighted the clientelistic nature of the political pacts of the period. For example, 
James Cason, the US Embassy’s Political Counsellor, argued that such pacts were part of a 
cynical elite game, played by the political parties to ‘steal as much money as they could for 
themselves’.72 In forging these agreements, political patronage was dished out amongst the 
various parties involved. This included the addition of three new ministries, 16 new vice-min-
isterial posts and 20,000 new public-sector employees during Paz Zamora’s presidency.73 
Pacted democracy allowed political elites to share power and divvy up the patronage of the 
state. From this more critical view, the politics of the clientelistic and authoritarian past were 
still in full effect. There were material costs in pursuing the issue of state–narco networks 
running through the political parties, and this led to the collective ‘vow of silence’. These 
linkages thus formed part of the political dynamic between the parties during the uncer-
tainty of the post-transition period, and indicated the enduring patrimonial nature of the 
Bolivian state.
The military
Equally, there remained concerns that the military’s commitment to democracy was contin-
gent. The civilian political leaders of this era had lived with a politicised military for decades, 
and so continued ‘to fear its political leverage and a possible return to military rule’.74 Reports 
of an abortive coup attempt in early 1984 planned by recently discharged officers connected 
to the ‘cocaine coup’ supported such suspicions. Indeed, the suggestion that the plot had 
been hatched in the wake of attempts to investigate the military for their involvement in 
drug corruption confirmed the anti-democratic tendencies of certain elements. The now 
dominant ‘institutionalist’ faction had pragmatically lent support for democracy and carried 
out a ‘token purge’ of the drug-liked officers,75 given the changing preferences of the mili-
tary’s North American patron, culpability for economic crisis and low-standing with the 
Bolivian public. But the factional nature of the institution made predictions of its future 
direction difficult. While the tide appeared to be turning towards democracy, Bolivian civil–
military relations were still delicately balanced. As such, politicians practised a policy of 
non-interference in the internal matters of the military, delaying institutional reform in return 
for the military’s withdrawal from politics.76 Indicative of the fragmented Bolivian state, the 
military enjoyed autonomy from civilian governmental control.
The extraordinary rendition of Arce Gomez to the US in December 1989 demonstrated 
the finely balanced nature of civil–military relations during this period. After years on the 
run, the former ‘minister of cocaine’ was located by DEA agents, living openly in in Santa 
Cruz. For some in the US Embassy, the brazenness of Arce Gomez hinted at protection from 
high levels of the Bolivian state.77 This lack of trust was also reflected in the secrecy of the 
operation, with suspected corrupt elements within the Bolivian government excluded from 
the planning and implementation of the operation. Still apparently wary of provoking the 
military by attempting prosecution within Bolivia, President Paz Zamora agreed that Arce 
Gomez should face trial in the US on drug trafficking offences. Despite the absence of an 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 04
:20
 03
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY  13
extradition treaty, the former colonel was flown out of the country by the DEA and arrested 
in Miami. The Bolivian government’s reluctance to a public trial of such a high-profile ‘military 
man’ indicated the fear civilian politicians still had of provoking a coup d’état.
Military institutional autonomy had implications for internal drug corruption. The mili-
tary’s retreat from power meant that the centralised systems of rent extraction of the author-
itarian era no longer functioned.78 In key areas of the coca-cocaine trade, though, military 
regional commands deepened links to drug traffickers. Pay-offs to secure profitable posts 
in the Chapare and the Beni then filtered through the institution.79 These formed part of a 
hierarchical system of patron–client bonds. The US government shared the perception that 
state–narco interactions remained embedded in the military. For example, the DEA claimed 
that ‘all elements of the military are involved in drug trafficking to some extent’,80 while a US 
Congress report stated that ‘most United States and Bolivian officials’ admit corruption is 
‘widespread and generally accepted within the Bolivian military’.81 However, within an uncer-
tain process of transition, toleration of autonomy – and by extension state–narco links – was 
linked to keeping the military in its barracks.
The police
The Bolivian police had benefitted from the democratisation process. Where previously the 
institution had been subordinated to the military, police funding and prerogatives were now 
enhanced. Post-transition governments looked to the police to act as an institutional coun-
terweight to the military, in return granting a high degree of autonomy from civilian control.82 
Institutional reform was placed on hold, as the political parties instead used patron–client 
bonds to achieve their aims.83 This included power over appointments to command posi-
tions, and disbursement of discretionary government funds. Particularism continued to 
define relations between different state actors. Post-transition governments feared that 
encroachments on the institution risked its support. Furthermore, as political leaders were 
reluctant to push for prosecutions of officers suspected of corruption or abuses, impunity 
was common. Between 1982 and 2002, for example, 20 national police commanders were 
linked with significant cases of corruption – many of these related to drugs – but not one 
was prosecuted.84 Taken together, these factors demonstrated the persistence of the patri-
monial and fragmented Bolivian state despite transition. Lack of reform meant that the 
authoritarian tendencies of the police remained unchallenged, limiting transparency, 
accountability and oversight. This facilitated police links to the illicit sphere.
Linkages between the police and the drug trade thus formed a third facet of the constel-
lation of post-transition state–narco interactions. The institution’s natural proximity to illicit 
activity created numerous opportunities for the extraction of bribes. Poorly paid officials in 
the Chapare, for example, were able to supplement their wages with ad hoc pay-offs, allowing 
contraband to flow in and out of the region.85 Reports suggested, though, that police drug 
corruption was also more systematic. The police had been incorporated into state–narco 
networks during the authoritarian era and, in the post-transition period, such practices con-
tinued. This reportedly included collusion with traffickers to ensure non-enforcement around 
transportation of large shipments.86 Patron–client interactions within the unreformed police 
institution were in turn solidified with such drug rents. For example, pyramid structures, in 
which subordinates would pay superiors for ranking positions, ensured drug money flowed 
through the institution.87 Indicative of uneven democratic institutionalisation, formal codes 
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and institutional arrangements ran parallel to irregular practices, such as hierarchical systems 
of corruption.88
Uneven democracy
Across these different political actors, therefore, tacit acceptance of state–narco networks 
was associated with maintaining political stability. Political elites of the period, in general, 
did not consider the drug trade to be a threat to national security.89 There was ambivalence 
towards it, given its relatively peaceful nature and its importance to the national economy. 
For example, Bolivia was not threatened by powerful drug cartels as in Colombia; and, fur-
thermore, coca-cocaine had acted to stabilise the national economy following economic 
crisis and the implementation of neoliberal structural reforms. On this latter point, coca 
cultivation provided inward investment and employment for a significant sector of the pop-
ulation, while narco dollars had stabilised the banking system following the liberalisation 
of capital controls.90 For the ‘democracy generation’, drugs were not the priority, but rather 
stability, economic growth and democratic consolidation.91 This included the ‘compromises’ 
of state–narco networks.
Such compromises were indicative of Bolivia’s uneven democratisation. The Bolivian state’s 
‘deviation’ from the liberal ideal type had implications for the process of democratisation. 
Different state actors pursued their own particular interests. Institutionalisation of Western-
liberal democratic norms was uneven across the different arms of the state. As such, ‘democ-
racy had triumphed but was known to have feet of clay’92: the ‘old reflexes and assumptions, 
and vested interests created by the previous history’ stood alongside democratic institu-
tions.93 This included the continuation of clientelistic politics and the autonomy of the secu-
rity forces. State–narco networks were embedded within these surviving remnants of the 
authoritarian past. Bolivia’s enduring form of ‘empirical statehood’ and the drug trade’s inter-
actions with it thus continued to shape the country’s ‘democratic’ future.
The legacies of authoritarianism – and the state–narco networks contained within – were 
tolerated within an uncertain process of political transition, as support for democracy from 
the main political actors was viewed as provisional. As such, non-enforcement of the norms 
of accountability and transparency limited the potential resistance of ‘informal veto players’ 
to (formal) democracy, inducing ‘powerful actors to accept rules they would otherwise seek 
to overturn’.94 In this sense, drug rents were not used to build factional coalitions behind a 
central authority, as was the case during military authoritarian governments. Rather, different 
political actors pursued drug rents independently (to different degrees). Reflecting the frag-
mentation of the Bolivian state, mutual toleration of these practices between different actors 
was tied to the maintenance of a tacit post-transition political settlement. As a result, agents 
of the state formed alliances with private actors to exploit drug revenues, eroding democratic 
notions of an even and universal rule of law.95
Conclusion
The case of post-transition Bolivia confounds the typical expectations of the mainstream 
policy and academic discourse of drugs. Moving beyond the blanket assumption of ‘drugs, 
violence and instability’, this article elucidates the role of state–narco networks in managing 
and mediating violence, and the relationship between the drug trade and Bolivia’s political 
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transition. This includes the informal forms of governance and political order that arose as 
part of state–narco interactions. I argue that the framework of ‘fragile states’ is insufficient 
to explain these interactions and their wider significance. The application of a political econ-
omy approach reveals the role of drug rents in Bolivia’s wider political development: the 
continuation of clientelistic and authoritarian practices in Bolivia’s uneven democracy, and 
the interconnectedness of these phenomena, state–narco networks and a delicately bal-
anced post-transition political settlement. In this way, the article brings greater nuance to 
theorisations of the relationship between the Bolivian state and the drug trade.
Re-thinking these linkages has important implications for drug policy, state-building and 
democratic development. Across Latin America, counterdrug efforts aimed at defeating the 
drug trade and establishing security have frequently been associated with heightened vio-
lence. Drug war ‘wins’ destabilise the drug trade, and lead to the emergence of new actors 
and (violent) competition to establish supremacy. In addition to this, they may disrupt the 
informal forms of governance – ie state–narco networks – that act to mediate violence in 
some cases. Within such contexts, the assumptions of a Weberian liberal-state perspective 
that underpin drug war policies misrepresent the actual functioning of state power. In Bolivia, 
state–narco links were viewed by local actors to be interwoven with political order. This is 
not to say that state–narco networks are desirable or sustainable in the long term. These 
relations were part of Bolivia’s uneven democracy, contributing to limited transparency, 
accountability and political competition. Stability and the maintenance of transition may 
have been used to justify such practices, but these also represented the accumulation of 
wealth and power among elite actors. As Gutierrez notes, ‘this kind of stability is short-term 
and may come at the expense of building more legitimate and accountable governance 
institutions’.96 Hence, this analysis raises important questions of how such particularistic and 
exclusionary systems may be decoupled from the state, while avoiding heightened violence 
and institutional decay.
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